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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we investigate the causal relationship between R&D cooperation and economic growth. We use an innovative 
econometric method which is based on a panel test of the Granger non causality hypothesis. We implement various tests 
with a sample of 32 industrial and developing countries over the 1970-2012 periods. The results provide support for a robust 
causality relationship from economic growth to the R&D cooperation. On the contrary, the non causality hypothesis from R&D 
cooperation to economic growth can’t be rejected in most of the cases. However, these results only imply that, if such a 
relationship exists, it can’t be easily identified in a simply bi-variate Granger causality test. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
R&D is a cumulative acquisition process of competences and know-how. The transfer of tacit knowledge is delicate 
and represents a specific characteristic of R&D. Moreover, certain expenditure is obligatory to R&D such as capital 
expenditures, infrastructures are irrecoverable. It is for that investment in R&D is an irreversible investment and subjected 
to an uncertainty. From uncertainty of cumulative process (R&D) is born a dynamic behaviour from information search 
which relates to nature of goods. However, the impact of technology creation process and diffusion on economic growth 
and the role of public administrations remains until our days less understood.  
Today, countries are confronted with structural changes which imply the reconstitution of production systems. 
Organizations forms which have allowed industrial development during the last two centuries must be reconfigured to the 
new technological economic and institutional challenges. Indeed, if technological and organisational change are 
necessarily localised as suggests Antonelli, operating with proximity of accumulated knowledge, it also passes by 
examination of new horizons according to March implying new competences to some internalized degree and required by 
cooperation. In this level, an interesting question appears:  why R&D cooperation and up to what point this one led to 
improve productivity to build a favourable framework to economic growth of countries? 
Technological cooperation remains one of economic reality which knows a notable growth since the beginning of the 
Eighties. One of the first and major contributions to theoretical literature on R&D cooperation is that of Katz. In Katz model, 
social benefit of the R&D cooperation depends mainly on two factors. The first is spillovers level (technological 
externalities) in this model, the effective R&D effort of a country within a cooperative structure corresponds to the sum of 
its own effort in expenditure R&D and provided efforts by partners countries in spillovers. Thus, since these spillovers are 
internalizes within a cooperative structure, those profits jointly with participating countries in the agreement and raise 
consequently the levels of effective R&D effort. This increase in innovation effort resulted reducing costs, increasing 
production levels and lowering prices.  
This paper is structured as follows: The next section describes literature on R&D cooperation which we indicate reason 
and base of knowledge to make. In particular, we analyze the conditions under which R&D cooperation makes more 
advantageous development of technological innovation. Indeed, this paper calls into question our problems and 
constitutes a general synthesis of the relation between R&D cooperation and economic growth.   
2. LITERATURE ON R&D COOPERATION  
R&D Cooperation belongs to the new developed strategies by countries in more globalize and competitive economic 
environment. The advantages of R&D cooperation for the participating countries are well-known. Countries engaged in 
R&D cooperation can profited from economies scale. Indeed, they can also benefit from the complementarities of their 
know-how and can avoid repetitions of their results. Another advantage of R&D cooperation is internalisation of 
"spillovers", due to the fact that patents do not reflect a perfect protection against imitations. The importance of 
cooperative research is recognized through the policies of certain governments. In particular search for projects in 
common runs "Research Joint Venture" (RJV) is guaranteed by the antitrust privilege acts and their formation is 
encouraged by subsidies. The reasons for cooperation are expensive and risky. Moreover, cooperation can increase 
efficiency, such as economy scale in production Veugelers.   
This paper is dealing with R&D cooperation. Indeed, several aspects of cooperative R&D were studied in economic 
literature. Theoretical literature analyzed intensively how "spillovers" affect investment in R&D in a cooperative situation 
compared with competition (no cooperation). Moreover, theoretical literature treats the stability search for joint project, 
organisational and asymmetry between partners’ researches. As an example, in Japan, industrial policy actively supported 
consortia formation of research since 1959. The Japanese spectacular growth in Sixties and Seventies were allotted 
mainly to cooperative research. Consequently, at the beginning of the Eighties American legislations and European 
increased their efforts of which the goal is to promote and to encourage R&D cooperation. In the Nineties, the USA 
increased the budget of advanced technology program which supports research projects combined to encourage common 
research considerably.   
Table 1:  The number of participants in co-operative research world enters (1986-2012) 
Year  Number of participant 
1986 22 
1987 15 
1988 23 
1989 47 
1990 217 
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1991 392 
1992 513 
1993 499 
1994 675 
1995 804 
1996 899 
1997 870 
1998 899 
2000 910 
2005 918 
2010 923 
2011 929 
2012 1020 
Source: Sdca-sdc Worldwide Joint ventures & Alliances. 
 
FIG 1: Evolution of the number of participants in cooperative research world over 1986 - 2012 
The table and the graph above illustrate the number growing of participant in cooperative research with an initial support 
from at least one million $. In 1985, Europeans Commission allocated permission for certain categories of the same R&D; 
it authorizes common exploitation of the R&D results. Moreover, there are several programs established and consolidated 
by European Commission to encourage R&D cooperation. The Strategic European program for research in technologies 
information (SPIRIT) is largest of these programs. Around 9000 organizations took part in more than 1200 Esprit- projects 
financed over 1983 - 1996.   
Geroski summarizes theoretical conclusions on this subject. He concludes that R&D projects are desirable when 
technological Spillovers and positive externalities profitable (share of risk) exist. Also, a nonexclusive consortium between 
companies which begin pro-competitive research is preferable with a cooperative agreement of research between 
companies on the same production market. According to Geroski discussion, when we evaluate the cooperative R&D 
impact we must separate its direct effect on productivity and its indirect effect through research intensity and competition 
McKelvie, A. and Wiklund, J.  Therefore, how does productivity assign R&D cooperation to the countries which have 
research joint activity? R&D can have positive impact on productivity. In fact, in cooperative research event, research 
productivity is affected. Therefore, the same amount of R&D investment results more (or less) innovation. Then, if 
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competing structure and R&D investments are non-affected, cooperation in the innovating activities increases (drops) the 
productivity compared with the case of competing R&D. This direct effect of R&D is studied by Baumol.   
With the development of the endogenous growth theories, economic analysis indeed highlighted role of knowledge 
accumulation in technical development, driving progress of growth. But knowledge is not a good like others. It rivet of 
specific characters which are the origin of externalities in its production and its diffusion. The R&D cooperation question 
and intellectual property can be placed in prospect with broader problems for the state role in growth promotion. The 
majority of endogenous growth models underlined the fact that the growth rate of an economy could be optimized thanks 
to state intervention to fight against external effects which cause divergence between research of social optimum and 
individual optimum. Thus, state education role or infrastructures supply could be proposed. In the same spirit, its action 
can be completely determining to support knowledge accumulation necessary to technical progress.  
3. R&D COOPERATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL SPILLOVERS  
In R&D cooperation management, we must distinguish three levels: the development of governmental policy, its 
implementation strategy (organizations directions and programs directions) and its execution (scientific community). For 
lack of a clear distinction between these three levels, a certain confusion reigns as for responsibilities for the ones and 
others, prejudicial confusion with a good cooperation piloting. The international cooperation concept is a very general 
concept which covers with various realities. In this work, the word cooperation will be used in its broadest direction.  R&D 
cooperation was also perceived like a potentials associating advisability of research activities with an aim of increasing 
capacity to be integrated in international economy, and to develop innovation efforts. The technological cooperation 
became a required organization to have external knowledge access Mowery, Oxley, Silverman,. In addition technological 
cooperation is perceived like an internalisation vehicle of technological externalities and diffusion effects of associated any 
research activity. This reflects the idea of D’Asprement. C and A. Jacquemin, Katz. M, and Ordover. J,. These impacts 
limit the inciting role of market investment in R&D and innovation.  
The limits of various works which is interested in spillovers impact on growth more precisely lead to introduction of 
technological cooperation interactions, like a diffusion mechanism of externalities. By regarding cooperation as a 
knowledge creation, two characteristics can be indicated; namely uncertainty and existence of an incomplete contracts, to 
show that spillovers can circulate within organisational forms.   
In Gallié. E optics, cooperation is seen as an externality knowledge vector. It developed a new design of the relation 
cooperation - externalities, contrary to D’Aspremont and Jacquemin analysis. At this level, economists develop two 
principal perceptions to knowledge externalities. In standard economy, spillovers are considered as a market failure. 
Producer cannot be remunerated by production cost. Their existence generates an incentive deficit to invest. The models 
of D’Asprement and Jacquemin propose to internalize spillovers in cooperation relations to mitigate failures market. The 
second perception notes that externalities constitute a determining factor of growth Broekel, T. et al,.  
The externalities due to research are related to knowledge diffusion: when a country continues an activity of research, a 
part of produced knowledge is diffused with other countries. These externalities have a strong effect on research output. 
R&D activity generates a level of excessive investment compared to what it would be collectively optimal to carry out 
Crampes,, Broekel, and Graf. The reasons are: Each country wants to be the first to succeed, whereas community is 
interested only by innovation realization, no matter on its origin. In addition, so many countries take part in research 
corresponding to the same innovation, which involves a repetition of research efforts.  
When technological externalities dominate, the market scale will be characterized by under investment in R&D. 
Conversely, when externalities strategic dominate, the market scale is characterized by an over-investment in R&D. This 
analysis of research is similar to traditional externalities analysis. Thus, according to externalities modern analysis, 
research externalities are liable to mechanisms of correction (internalization) in the optics of a convergence between 
private and public optimum. The first mechanism corresponds to the assistances systems and subsidies to R&D. The 
second consists in granting to innovators a right of ownership on the result of their activities. The internalization 
externalities literature of research admits often assumptions according to which, the failure market involves state 
intervention and, the innovator has through protection of intellectual property of appropriation knowledge. The problem of 
externality is not a unilateral problem, but a bilateral problem between the transmitter and the receiver. In the field of 
knowledge production, creation of collective entities (partnership, consortium) allows also internalized externalities. Thus 
the question is to amplify the diffusion zone not to have work on knowledge appropriation.   
4. APPROPRIATION OF R&D COOPERATIVE RESULTS  
Our primarily work aims are to show that cooperation, and in particular R&D consortia, make to partners possibility to 
innovate and to adapt scientific and technological results. Starting from an appropriability definition, the principal factors 
supporting this innovation within consortia in R&D are emphasized. Econometric analyses show that R&D consortia 
produce various results which can be explained by specific methods of cooperation. If R&D consortia are the subject of an 
increasing interest, former research was primarily directed towards empirical studies relating to a broad sample of R&D 
consortia are still in a very limited number. Moreover, appropriation studies were limited to appropriability problems and 
legal means giving possibility to the countries of benefiting from their innovations and protecting them from a possible 
imitation.  
The concept of appropriation is useful to include the principal conditions to technological change and innovations 
realization. Indeed, appropriations used by theorists of ownership, which characterize R&D like a non appropriable public 
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property. Technological innovation will be entirely suitable and transform in economic innovation only under the condition 
of having an absorption capacity as suggest Cohen W and Levinthal, in order to be able to integrate know how. Thus 
appropriation concept refers to two various logics. The first, in general bring closer to economic analysis and of ownership 
theory. The second is attached to cognitive sciences and evolutionist theories and competences, and refers to training 
while returning more precisely to absorption capacity. On the other hand, it is sufficient to be limited to absorption capacity 
to justify research cooperation. If not, which assumption is necessary to adopt cooperate R&D.  
5. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS BY DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODELS 
The goal of this analysis is to examine in a structure of dynamic panel data the role of R&D cooperation in innovation 
process. Initially, the analysis is focused on the impact R&D cooperation -in accordance with others factors - on production 
innovation. Our objective is to show if R&D cooperation are complementary to innovation process, by increasing 
innovation and production of companies measured by the intensity of internal R&D, respectively by innovations realization 
product. The intensity of internal R&D stimulates also probability of R&D cooperation between various countries. The 
majority of innovation activities imply multiple actors. The development of new products requires an active research 
process implying several companies and establishments to discover new knowledge sources and technology as suggests 
DeBresson, ; Nooteboom,; Von Hippel,. The countries which engage in innovation activities are conscious of the need for 
establishing R&D cooperation to obtain new products which cannot be produced inside these countries. Such R&D 
cooperation is defined as collaborations to achieve a common goal which is to develop new and improved products (of 
technologies).   
In a more or less durable multitude of agreements between two or several associates, credits and activities are linked and 
combined. Thus, the technological capacities are necessary to develop process innovations. The importance of increased 
R&D cooperation regularly thanks to increasing complexity, risks and innovation costs2. Within the framework of our 
analysis we primarily try to specify many objectives: The role played by technological cooperation in justification of 
investment effort in research and development; In which measurements technological cooperation is perceived like a 
privileged vector of innovation and incentive to innovate and technological cooperation impact on countries growth (in term 
of GDP per capita).  
5.1 Empirical literature reviews  
R&D cooperation belongs to new strategies developed by countries in more globalize and competitive economic 
environment. The advantages R&D cooperation for participating countries are well-known. Indeed, the participants R&D 
cooperation can profit from, and economies scale complementarities of their know-how and can avoid the repetitions of 
their results. Another advantage of R&D cooperation is spillovers internalization, owing to the fact that patents do not 
reflect a perfect protection against imitations. The cooperative importance of research is recognized through the 
government’s policies. Search for common projects runs in particular "Research Joint Venture" (RJV) is guaranteed by 
privilege of antitrust acts and their formation is encouraged by subsidies etc.    
In the framework of opening of economy world and increasing competition countries develop new strategies. New 
strategies imply networks of intensive work. The reasons for cooperation are expensive and risky. Moreover, cooperation 
can increase efficiency, such as economy scale in production. This study concentrates on R&D cooperation. Within this 
framework, several aspects of cooperative R&D were studied in economic literature. The theoretical literature analyzed 
intensively how spillovers affect investment in R&D in a cooperative situation compared with competition. Moreover, 
theoretical literature treats stability of search joint project, organisational design and asymmetry between partner’s 
researches.     
In the same way research of joint projects is formed starting from antitrust laws because they are considered to promote 
productivity. Also, to analyze participation research effects programmes of joint project on productivity is an interesting 
question. Estimation of total cooperative research advantages is very difficult because cooperation can have an impact on 
R&D expenditure. Geroski summarizes theoretical conclusions on this subject. He concludes that R&D projects are 
desirable when technological spillovers and positive externalities (share risk) exist. According to Geroski discussion when 
we evaluate R&D cooperative impact we must separate his direct effect on productivity and indirect effect through 
research intensity competition. Therefore, how does productivity affect R&D cooperation?. 
R&D can have a positive impact on productivity. Therefore, the same amount of investment in R&D results more (or less) 
innovation. Then, if R&D investments are non-affected, cooperation in innovating activities increases productivity 
compared with case of competing R&D. This direct effect of joint research and development is studied by Kamien et al., 
Baumol. The common characteristic of their analysis is that they model innovation process (reduction cost).  They present 
a modelling of innovation process with R&D spillovers. They clarify an innovation model as a process in two stages where 
in the first stage knowledge is produced and in the second stage this knowledge is employed to reduce the cost.  
A limited number of empirical studies are centred on reasons for participation in research consortia. The only exceptions 
are Irwin and Klenow studies about productivity carried out an econometric analysis of Japanese research consortia. They 
found that governmental expenditure of R&D consortia has leads to increase R&D expenditure. They measured research 
production by the number of patents. The increase in productivity implies a direct and positive effect of common research 
on productivity.    
In this paper we study implications of productivity of participation in cooperative research. Moreover, we use a sample of 
various countries over 1992-2011 where information is available on R&D expenditure. We try to separate total investment 
R&D effect and cooperative research participation on productivity. We try to use generalized moments method developed 
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by Arellano and Bond, we control possible endogeneity of independent variable, and while adopting recent econometrics 
literature of panel data relating to unit roots tests, causality and cointegration. Finally we estimate our model by Full 
Modified Ordinary Least Square method "FMOLS" and we try to interpret results.  
5.2 Model Presentation  
The models which are interested in cooperative research influence on productivity take account of spillovers effects. 
These spillovers would be mainly proposed for private research. Public research would not profit from overflow resulting 
effects from other public institutions. Nevertheless, public spillovers diffusion was sometimes tested upstream in 
innovation process by introducing external public R&D into function which determines public R&D. Association of 
spillovers terms and cooperation is a little usual. However, as underline it Cassiman B and Veugelers. R any exchange, 
any transfer is likely to cause spillovers. We consider that cooperation can be used as a spillovers vector because of non-
rival character of knowledge and uncertainty of knowledge process. Indeed, knowledge is not subject to the same rules of 
appropriation as in private sector. In fact, the objective of researchers is not to adapt their discovery to illustrate financial 
profits but to establish a principle priority, generally thanks to publications. In this case, there exists, established priority, 
no limit with knowledge diffusion. Cooperation within public networks should support considerably knowledge diffusion 
published.  
Within framework of our study we consider a log-linear Cobb-Douglas product function transformed:    
it it it 11 2 3 4 it 1 5 t i itit it 1
(1)y y RJVL K RD                
For more precision, the basic model examined in our empirical justification is drawn from R&D cooperation literature. We 
postulate that GDP per capita engaged by governments is function of R&D expenditure and R&D cooperation, capital and 
labour. The model is presented in the form of log-linear relation between various variables. Thus, we define:   
Y: logarithm real GDP per capita for country (i) in the year (t);  
K:  logarithm of capital for country (i) in the year (t);  
L:  labour factor for country (i) in the year (t);   
RD:  expenditure of research and development ratio to the GDP for country (i) in the year (t); and 
RJV:  R&D cooperation expenditure calculated as a Spillover effect.   
We try to take account of temporal structure of expenditure and of GDP variables With this intention, we must test the 
presence of unit root test and if all the series are non stationary I(1) The recent approaches adopted by Im, Pesaran and 
Shin IPS and by Kao are respectively used for unit root and cointegration test. The first consists in carrying out unit root 
tests on each series by using Augmented Dickey-Fuller, method Dickey and Fuller,; Davidson and MacKinnon,. We obtain 
then statistics serving to make unit root test for panel by calculating individual statistics ADF average. This value is 
compared with simulated breaking values provided by IPS. When it is higher than the value given threshold of 
significance, null assumption of unit root is rejected.   
As for used approach by Kao for Cointegration, it consists in making individual regressions of ordinary least squares (OLS) 
of Y on RJV and carrying out ADF tests on estimated residues of these series Robert Engle and Granger,. The statistics 
being used to test null assumption of non-cointegration are obtained by calculating the average of ADF statistics 
previously obtained. It is compared with breaking values provided by Kao and makes it possible to reject null assumption if 
it is higher. This leads us to analyze series for each country.   
We try to take account of temporal structure of variables with this intention, we must test the presence of unit root and if all 
series are non stationary. The recent approaches adopted by Im, Pesaran and Shin IPS and by Kao are respectively used 
for unit root and cointegration test. The first consists in carrying out unit root tests on each series by using Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller, method Dickey and Fuller,; Davidson and MacKinnon,. We obtain then statistics serving to make unit root 
test for panel by calculating individual statistics ADF average. This value is compared with simulated breaking values 
provided by IPS. When it is higher than the value given threshold of significance, null assumption of unit root is rejected.   
As for used approach by Kao for cointegration, it consists in making individual regressions of ordinary least squares (OLS) 
of R&D on COP and carrying out ADF tests on estimated residues of these series Robert Engle and Granger,. The 
statistics being used to test null assumption of non-cointegration are obtained by calculating the average of ADF statistics 
previously obtained. It is compared with breaking values provided by Kao and makes it possible to reject null assumption if 
it is higher. This leads us to analyze series for each country.   
5.3 Econometric Estimation of Dynamic Panel Data Models 
We start with Judson and Own  methodology for estimating dynamic panel data models. 
5.3.1 Fixed effect Estimator for Dynamic Panel Data 
Consider the dynamic fixed effects model 
1;,,1,    tiititiit xyy  (2) 
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Where, 
i is a fixed-effect, xi,t is a (k)x1 vector of exogenous regressors and it~N(0,2) is a random disturbance.  Assuming 
2 > 0, 
E(i,t, j,s) = 0 i  j or t  s (3) 
E(xi,t, j,s) = 0  i, j, t, s 
 
“The fixed effects model is gradually more appropriate than a random effects model for two reasons.  First, if the individual 
effect represents omitted variables, it is likely that these country-specific characteristics are correlated with the other 
regressors. Second, it is also likely that a typical macro panel will contain most countries of interest and, thus, will not be a 
random sample from a much larger universe of countries, e.g. an OECD panel contains most OECD countries” Judson 
and Owen. 
The model for yi,t is given in eq.(2); xi,t was generated with 
xi,t = xi,t-1 + vi,t  
vi,t  N(0, 2v) (4) 
Thus, in addition to , , 2v also determine the correlation between yi,t and xi,t.  Kiviet defines a signal to noise ratio, 2s 
2s = Var (ui,t  i,t), ui,t  yi,t  
1
1
i (5) 
and shows that it can be calculated from other parameters of the model as follows 
2
2
2
1
2
2
222
1
)(]1[
1
)(
1 


















vs
  (6) 
The higher the signal-to-noise ratio, the more useful xi,t is in explaining yi,t. 
5.3.2 “Mixed, Fixed and Random” Model for Dynamic Panel Data 
Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, introduced a dynamic panel data model in which the intercepts and the coefficients on the 
lagged endogenous variables are specific to the cross section units, while the coefficients on the exogenous variables are 
assumed to be normally distributed across the cross section.  Thus the model includes mixture of fixed coefficients and 
random coefficients, called the “MFR” model. Consider a simple model: 
yi,t=i+iyi,t-1+ixi,t+i,t (7) 
Where, 
i = 

+ 1i, i = 

+2i and  is a random disturbance.  The model can thus be rewritten as: 
yi,t = i + 

yi,t-1 + 

xi,t + Ui,t (8) 
where, 
Ui,t = 1,iyi,t-1 + 2i xi,t + i,t 
There is clearly a serious problem with this specification as the error term is correlated with the lagged dependent variable.  
If instead we model the coefficient on the lagged dependant variable as fixed rather than random, but constrain it to be 
equal across all cross section units so that: 
yi,t  =  i +yi,t-1 + ixi,t + i,t (9) 
But there could still be significant biases introduced if in fact the coefficients on lagged dependent variable are not 
constant across the cross section. 
5.3.3 Fixed Coefficients Approach 
Hurlin and Venet, proposed an extension of the Granger (1969) causality definition to panel data models with fixed 
coefficients. 
Consider the following model: 
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 (10) 
with PN* and vi,t = i + i,t, where i,t are i.i.d. (0,2).  Contrary to NairReichert and Weinhold, assume that the 
autoregressive coefficients (k) and the regression coefficients slopes 
)(K
i  are constant k [1,P].  Also assume that 
parameters (k) are identical for all individuals, whereas the regression coefficients slopes 
)(K
i  could have an individual 
dimension.  Consider the following assumptions on the error components of vi,t: 
i) E(i) = E (i,t) = E(ii,t) = 0 
ii) E(i j) = 





ji
ji
0
2

 
iii) E (i,t j,s) = 





jist
jist
,0
,2
 
iv) E(i xi,s) = E (i,t, xi,s) = 0, (s,t) 
In model (10), under assumptions (AI), Hurlin and Venet, consider four principal cases.  Let us define 
),/( ,,, tititi xyyE  
the best linear predictor of yi,t given the set of past values of yi,t, denoted 
),.....,,.....,( 1,0,,,   tipiti yyyy  and the 
set of past and present values of xi,t, denoted 
),.....,.....,,( ,1,0,,,   tiiipiti xxxxx . 
5.4 Unit Root and causality in Panel Data 
We start with panel unit root test. 
5.4.1 Panel Unit Root Test 
Levin and Lin, consider the following model: 
yi,t=iyi,t–1+Zit+ui,t (11) 
(i=1, …, N; t=1, …, T) 
Where, 
Zi,t is the deterministic component and ui,t is a stationary process.  Zi,t could be zero, one, the fixed effects, i, or fixed 
effect as well as a time trend.  The Levin and Lin (LL) tests assume that ui,t are iid (0,2u) and i= for all i.  The LL test is 
restrictive in the sense that it requires  to be homogeneous across i.  Im, Pesaran and Shin  (IPS) allow for a 
heterogeneous coefficient of yi,t-1 and propose an alternative testing procedure based on averaging individual unit root 
test statistics.  IPS suggested an average of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests when ui,t is serially correlated with 
different series. Correlation properties across cross-sectional units, i.e.; itjitij
p
jti uu
i   1, .  Substituting this ui,t 
in (11) we get: 
ititjitij
p
jititi zyyy
i    11,  (12) 
The null hypothesis is: 
Ho : i = 1 
for all i and the alternative hypothesis is: 
Ha : i < 1 
For at least one i.  The IPS t-bar statistic is defined as the average of the individual ADF statistic as: 
i
N
i
t
N
t 
1
1


         (13) 
where ti is the individual t-statistic of testing Ho : i = 1 in (13).  It is known for a fixed N as T   
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IPS assume that tiT are iid are have finite mean variance.  Then 
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 (15) 
as N  by the Lindeberg-Levy central limit theorem.  Hence 
 
)1,0(
]/[
1/[
1
N
tVar
tEtN
t
iiT
iiT
IPS 




 (16) 
as T  followed by N  sequentially.  The values of E[tiT/i=1] and Var[tiT/i=1] have been computed by IPS vis 
simulations for different values of T and is. 
5.4.2 Causality test Approach 
5.4.2.1  Homogenous Non-Causality Hypothesis 
The first case corresponds to the homogenous non-causality (HNC) Hypothesis.  Conditionally to the specific error 
components of the model, this hypothesis implies that there does not exist any individual causality relationships: 
     itititiititi xyyEyyENi  ,,/,/,1 ,,,,,   (19) 
In model (9), the corresponding test is defined by: 
   pkNH i
K
io ,1,,10:
)( 
 (20) 
0/),(: )(  Kia kiH   
In order to test these Np linear restrictions, we compute the following Wald Statistic: 
 ppNNTRSS
NpRSSRSS
Fhnc



)1(/
)/()(
1
12
 (21) 
where, 
RSS2 denotes the restricted sum of squared residual obtained under Ho and RSS1 corresponds to the residual sum of 
squares of Model (12).  For the ith individual’s characteristics into T elements columns, so write 
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Let us denote ‘e’ the (T,1) unit vector.  Then, the model (12) can be written as: 
],1[)()(
0
)()(
1
)( Niexyy ii
K
i
K
i
p
K
K
i
K
p
K
O
i  

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introduce here two matrix: 
]:.....::[ )()2()1(
),(
p
iiii yyyw pT   
]:.....::[ )()1()0(
)1,(
p
iiii xxxx pT   
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Finally, the model (13) can be written as: 
  )(~ eIxwy N  (22) 
with 
  =  (1, 2, …. N)´ 
In short; If we define 
)(]~:[   andxwZ
 the model (13) can also be written as: 
  )1( eZy N  (23) 
Let us define the following operator Q as: 
TNNTNT QIQ ),(  (24) 
with QT = 1T  e e´/T.  Then, the sums of squared residuals of the model (13) obtained under Ho and Ha can be 
computed as follows: 
RSS1=y´Qy(y´Qz)(z´Qz)1(z´Qy) (25) 
RSS2=y´Qy(y´Qw)(w´Qw)–1(w´Qy) (26) 
For large samples (where N and T tend to infinity), under assumptions AI, the Fhnc statistic has a Fischer distribution with 
Np and NTN(1+P)P degrees of freedom.  If the realization of this statistic is not significant, the homogeneous non-
causality hypothesis is accepted.  This result implies that the variable x is not causing y in all the N countries of the 
samples.  The non-causality result is then totally homogenous and the testing procedure with go no further. 
5.4.2.2 Homogenous Causality Hypothesis (HC) 
The second case corresponds to the homogenous causality (HC) hypothesis, in which there exists N causality 
relationships: 
     itititiititi xyyEyyENi  ,,/,/,1 ,,,,,                (27) 
In this case, assume that the N individual predictors, obtained conditionally to 
titi
xy ,, ,  and i, are identical: 
     jtjtjtiitititi xyyExyyENji  ,,/,,/,1),( ,,,,,,             (28) 
If we reject the null hypothesis of non homogenous causality (HNC), two configurations could appear.  The first one 
corresponds to the overall causality hypothesis (Homogenous causality hypothesis, HC) and occurs if all the coefficients 
K
i are identical for all k and non null.  The second on, which is the more plausible, is that some coefficients 
K
i  are 
different for each individual.  Thus, after the rejection of the null hypothesis of HNC, the second step of the procedure 
consists in testing if the regression slope coefficients associated to xi,t–k are identical.  This test corresponds to a 
standard homogeneity test.  Formally, the homogenous causality hypothesis (HC) test is the following: 
                                           
],1[/],1[: NipkH kkio    (29) 
k
j
k
ia NjipkH   /],1[),(],,1[:  
The HC hypothesis implies that the coefficients of the lagged explanatory variable xi,t-k are identical for each lag k and 
different from Zero.  Indeed, if we have rejected, in the previous step, the HNC hypothesis
),(0 kiKi  , this 
standard specification test allows testing the homogenous causality hypothesis. 
In order to test the HC hypothesis, we have to compute the following F statistics: 
 ppNNTRSS
NpRSSRSS
Fhc



)1(/
)1(/[)(
1
13
 (30) 
where RSS3 corresponds to the realization of the residual sum of squares obtained in model (13) when one imposes the 
homogeneity for each lag k of the coefficients associated to the variable xi,t–k. 
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As for the HNC hypothesis test, if assume that individual effects i are fixed under Ho and Ha, the MLE estimator 
corresponds to the fixed effects (FE) estimator.  The residual sum of squares RSS1 obtained in model (13) is given by 
equation (22).  Under Ho, the realization of the residual sum of squares RSS3, is then defined by: 
RSS3=y´Qy(y´Qx)(x´Qx)–1(x´Qy) (31) 
Where (TN, P+1) matrix x is defined by: 
]....[ 21),1(   NTNp xxxx  
Under assumptions A1, if the Fhc statistics with P(N1) and NTN(1+P)P degrees of freedom is not significant, the 
homogenous causality hypothesis is accepted.  This result implies that the variable x is causing y in the N countries of the 
samples, and that the autoregressive processes are completely homogenous. 
5.4.2.3 Heterogeneous Causality Hypothesis (HEC) 
The third case corresponds to the heterogeneous causality hypothesis (HEC).  Under HEC hypothesis, assume first that 
there exists at least one individual causality relationships (and at the most N), and second that individual predictors, 
obtained conditionally to 
ttiti
xy ,, ,,  and i, are heterogeneous. 
),,/(),/(],1[ ,,,,, itititiititi xyyEyyENi                (32) 
),,/(),,/(],1[),( ,,,,,, jtjtjtjitititi xyyExyyENji        (33) 
5.4.2.4 Heterogeneous Non-Causality Hypothesis (HENC) 
The last case corresponds to the HENC.  In this case, assume that there exists at least one and at the most N1 equalities 
of the form 
),,/(),/(],1[ ,,,,, itititiititi xyyEyyENi           (34) 
If the HC hypothesis is rejected, it implies that the process is non-homogenous and that no homogenous relationships can 
be founded.  However, it does not imply the lack of any causality relationships between the two variables.  It may be 
possible that for one individual at least, there exists such a relationships.  In this case, we get a non-homogenous 
causality configuration.  Thus, the variable x causes the variable y only for a subgroup of the cross-section population. 
Clearly, all the interest of the heterogeneous causality hypothesis is determined by the size of this sub-group.  So, the third 
step of the procedure consists in testing the heterogeneous non-causality hypothesis (HENC).  For that, we consider the 
following test: 
0],1[/],1[:  Kio pkNiH   (35) 
0/],1[],,1[:  Kia NkNiH   
They proposed here to test this last hypothesis with two nested tests.  The first test is an individual test realized for each 
individual.  For each individual i = 1, …., N, test the nullity of all the coefficients of the lagged explanatory variable xi,t–k.  
Then, for each i, test the hypothesis
],1[,0 pkKi  . 
For that, compute N statistics: 
 ppNNTRSS
pRSSRSS
F
ii
hene



)21(/
/)(
1
1,2
 (36) 
Where RSS2,i corresponds to the realization of the residual sum of squares obtained in model (13), when one imposes 
the nullity of the k coefficients associated to the variable xi,tk only for the individual i.  These N individual tests allow us to 
identify the individual for which there are no causality relationships.  If we assume that individual effects i are fixed under 
Ho, the residual sum of squares RSS2,i is then defined by: 
RSS2,i=y´Qy(y´Qzi)(z´iQzi)–1(z´iQy) (37) 
where 
]~:[ ii xwz   with i
x~
 defined by: 
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For a given first order risk , we can compute the corresponding size denoted nnc(), of the sub-group of individuals for 
which there is no causality relationships. 
A second test of the procedure consists in testing the joint hypothesis that there are no causality relationships for a sub-
group of individuals.  Let us respectively denote Ic and Inc the index sets corresponding to sub-groups for which there 
exists a causal relationships and there does not exist a causal relationship.  In other words, we consider the following 
model t  [1,T]: 
tikti
k
i
p
K
kti
k
i
p
k
ti vxyy ,,
0
,
1
,  



 
 (38) 
With     nc
K
i
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Let nc = dim(Ic) and nnc=dim (Inc).  Suppose that nc/nnc   <  as nc and nnc tend to infinity.  One solution to test the 
HENC hypothesis is to compute the Wald statistic. 
 pnpNNTRSS
pnRSSRSS
F
c
nc
henc



)1(/
)/()(
1
14
 (39) 
Where RSS4 corresponds to realization of the residual sum of squares obtained in model (13) when one imposes the 
nullity of the k coefficients associated to the variable xi,tk for the nnc individuals of the Inc sub-group. 
If the HENC hypothesis is accepted, it implies that there exists a sub-group of individual for which the variable x does not 
cause the variable y.  The dimension of this sub-group is then equal to nnc.  On the contrary, if the HENC hypothesis is 
rejected, it implies that there exists causality relationships between x and y for all individual of the panel. 
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section we summarize the results of unit root, cointegration and causality based on panel data tests. 
6.1 Panel Unit Root (IPS) Test Results 
The first step in determining a potentially cointegrated relationship is to test whether the variables involved are stationary 
or non-stationary, i.e. where the individual series contain unit roots.  If all the variables are stationary, then traditional 
estimation methods can be used to estimate the relationship between the variables, in this case, real GDP per capita (Y) 
and indicators of financial development (RD, K, L and RJV).  If, however, at least one of the series is non-stationary then 
more care is required.  In the first case we assume that none of the individual series in our model contains a trend.  Thus, 
it is assumed for each series, yi,t that E(y*it)=0.  This means that each series could contain a non-zero intercept but not a 
time trend.  The results based on IPS t-bar statistic are reported in Table 1. 
Table 1: Unit Root Tests 
 v-stat Rho Pp Adf Rho
1
 PP
1
 Adf
1
 
Y, K, L, RD, RJV 2.072 -2.65 -6.64 -3.68 - 4.89 -9.45 -4.78 
                                                                                                                   1 
it acts of the tests based on dimension BETWEEN 
As it is a one-sided test, a statistic less than 2.18 (1.99) would cause rejection at 1%(5%) of the null of non-stationarity.  
All series clearly fail to reject the null of unit root.  However, our assumption that there is no time trend, especially in the 
case of real per capita GDP may not be very appropriate.  Therefore, we test stationarity again allowing for a time trend. 
All the series are found to be non-stationary (we fail to reject Ho).  Given the presence of non-stationary variables in both 
specifications, we now proceed to test for Cointegration. 
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6.2 Panel cointegration Test Results 
This section report country-by-country and panel cointegration test results based on the trace test procedure and panel 
Cointegration Rank test.  For each country the cointegrating rank is determined by the sequential likelihood ratio trace test 
procedure.  As seen from Table, in case of real per capita GDP(Y), the most common selected rank is r=1 (7 of the 10 
countries have r=1), which indicate a Cointegration relation between Y and RJV for these countries.  For two countries the 
rank result is r=0 (Indonesia and Sri Lanka) and for Singapore the selected rank is r=2.  The case for Y and RD shows the 
selected rank is r=1 for 8 out 10 countries.   
Table 2: Tests of cointegration of Pedroni 
Statistics Y RJV K L RD 
Levin-Lin ADF-
stat 
3.748 -2.205 -2.005 -1.978 -1.890 
IPS ADF-stat 2.717 -2.183 -1.879 -2.778 -2.090 
From results of Pedroni cointegration tests we can notice that the whole of statistics are lower than breaking value of 
normal law for a threshold of 5% (-1,64). So the whole of these tests requires the existence of a cointegration relation. 
With an aim of carrying out cointegration tests on panel data and to obtain an estimation of cointegration vectors it is 
necessary to apply an effective method of estimation. Within this framework we can distinguish several techniques with 
FMOLS method (Full Modified Least Square) used by Pedroni, DOLS method (Dynamic Least Square), GMM method.  
6.3 Panel Causality Tests Results 
Causality tests are used to determine the direction of causality between the variables of the estimated model we are 
interested especially in the context of our research variables RJV, R&D and GDP. Because of this, is what the R&D cause 
the cooperative R&D, growth or is the cooperative R&D because the R&D and growth, or is it a causality in both sense. 
That is why it is better first of all clarifying the meaning of causality. 
    We have shown in our research in the master that private spending caused government spending Granger whether past 
expenditures contribute in explaining public expenditure at time (t). Similarly, public spending than private cause if the past 
of the variable R&D public helps in explaining the variable R&D privately. In the same context, we have demonstrated that 
R&D contributes to the explanation of economic growth, causality goes from R&D to growth and at the same time growth 
to R&D. 
    At this point, what is the direction of causality between R&D cooperation, R&D and economic growth and how can we 
identify causality. In the context of dynamic panels, special attention is paid in recent year’s econometricians this question 
in order to be able to identify causality in dynamic panel based on the work initiated by Engel and Granger. 
The work was based on the question of what is the point of switch panel?. 
 Indeed, this passage is explained by three reasons: 
Allows you to compensate for the lack of information in the temporal dimension by taking into account an individual 
dimension: the heterogeneity of problem behaviors 
Part of the literature tends to adapt to the problems of time series panel models: unit root tests, Cointegration tests, 
VECM, etc. .. Trend related to the emergence of macro panel. 
Company more fundamental theory: a causal relationship from X to Y must it is specific to an individual (country) or on the 
contrary a common set of individuals (countries) to be considered valid? So, How to implement the Granger causality 
(1969) in the panel? To do this, we must consider in general from: 
A functional form: linear predictor, 
A risk function: mean square error, 
The type of process: Process stationary 
The horizon of prediction: Toward a period, 
The set of information. 
It has now become possible to estimate a panel with the dimensions N and T are large. Groups can be corporations, 
industries, regions or countries. Similarly, there are several major advantages for the use of panel data instead of using 
time series data or cross-sectional. In cases where there is limited time series due to unavailability of data for each 
country, there may be problems in hypothesis testing. While it is possible to impose some conditions to the parameters of 
homogeneity across countries a model of panel data provides additional power and allows the detection of some of the 
different relations not series. The revival of interest in long-term growth and the availability of macroeconomic data, 
estimating dynamic panel models, has been a key concern for many authors. 
The case of Vector Autoregressive panel in a structure in which to test the Granger causality in panel and suggest the use 
of different instruments and levels. In addition, other instruments have been suggested by several other authors. In this 
context, it cites as a guide the work of Arellano and Bond, Arellano and Bover,. 
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Kiviet shows that panel data models, using the estimation by the method of instrumental variables, often lead to efficient 
and unbiased estimators. Judson and Owen  show that when T = 30 using LSDV can be less than 20% of the true value of 
the coefficient to be estimated. A corrected LSDV estimator noted "LSDVC" is the best unbiased estimator, but practical 
considerations may limit its applicability. The generalized method of moments (GMM) provides in general more efficient 
estimators. This method is related to Anderson and Hsiao. Finally, a GMM estimator that uses a subset of the lagged 
variables as instruments increases significantly the efficiency of the estimators. In practice, there are two important 
econometric problems in estimating dynamic panel models. First, the estimated parameters are biased in models with 
fixed effects and lagged dependent variables. Second, the assumptions of homogeneity, which are often imposed on the 
coefficients of the lagged dependent variable, can lead to a bias problem. 
    The above discussion deals with the first type of bias. Pearson confirms that the bias of homogeneity can cause a bias 
that cannot be corrected by the estimation using instrumental variables. 
From the above discussion, we take the estimator "GMM" of Judson and Owen  and Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 
comparing the estimators developed fixed coefficients See the first section, for more details. Hurlin and Venet. 
    Finally, we propose an application of the above models to the question of the relationship between cooperative R&D 
(RJV) and economic growth. Cooperation in R&D has been recently advanced the goal of several studies, instead of 
economic growth. The link R&D growth raises two fundamental questions: first, does a close association between 
economic growth and cooperation in R&D involve an automatic link between the two? On the other hand, the benefits of 
economic growth they have an automatic impact on the level of R&D, and hence cooperation in this area? The answer to 
both questions is examined through tests of causality. 
    We test the hypothesis of causality is not homogeneous (HNC) between the cooperative R&D and economic growth, 
but also the capital (K), labor (L) and R & D. We use three different estimators, and those of Hurlin Venet (HV), Nair-
Reichert and Weinhold. The GMM estimator is used to test the hypothesis (HNC) above. The results are reported in 
Appendix 15. Each of the three estimators strongly rejects the hypothesis of HNC, regardless of the choice of about 
delays, but the values of all the estimators are different in every case. This means that we can assume that the time 
dimension of the panel (T=35) is sufficient to consider using dynamic panel as insignificant. 
    First, as part of the study of causality in our panel research, we examine the causality of the cooperative R&D to GDP 
per capita. 
The results show that the assumption of homogeneous non-causality (HNC) is strongly rejected in all cases (RJV → GDP, 
GDP R&D → L → K → GDP and GDP), irrespective of the choice of the order of delay (P = 1, 2, 3). This means that the 
causality of the cord to GDP, R&D to GDP, K and L to GDP to GDP cannot be rejected for the entire sample of 32 
countries. After the rejection of the hypothesis of HNC, we evaluate the hypothesis of homogenous causality (HC). This 
assumption, which imposes strict homogeneity of the relationship between cooperative R&D and GDP per capita, is 
rejected for all the delays. 
These results confirm the relative heterogeneity of the sample of 32 countries. Indeed, it is not surprising that these 
countries do not follow a unique model of cooperation in R&D and do not show different correlations between cooperation 
and growth. Given these results, we must consider the heterogeneous causal relations (hypothesis HENC).  
    These results indicate that the variable RJV causes GDP in the sense of Granger in the countries of the panel (China, 
India, Japan, Korea, Israel, Canada, USA, Mexico, Brazil ...). However, causal relationships are independent of the delay 
for only four countries (China, India, Japan, and Korea). For other countries, such as (Algeria and Egypt) there is no 
causal relationship between the string and GDP. The conclusion about the non-uniform causation and causality is not 
uniform for different RJV relation to GDP. Results based on FNHC and F HC are the same for the case of R&D → GDP, 
meaning that the reports of the research and development and economic growth are not homogeneous in our sample. See 
table 3 and 4. 
Test results of reverse causality of GDP on R&D cooperation, based on FHNC and FHC  show that the assumption of 
homogeneous non-causality and the assumption of uniform causality are strongly rejected for each three cases, GDP → 
RJV, RD → GDP, GDP and GDP → L → K. However, we found the causal relationship heterogeneous strong in almost all 
cases. We observe that the GDP contributes to the improvement of the rope in 19 countries in the sample. . See table 5 
and 6. 
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We can say generally that through the results of different tests of causality mentioned above we were able to show the 
importance of cooperation in R&D in economic growth as a channel of transmission of technological spillovers at the Like 
other transmission channels such as foreign direct investment, imitation, financial integration etc ... 
Our analysis allowed us to study the role played by the international dissemination of knowledge on economic growth. The 
most important result of our work is that economic integration between two countries could build a guaranteed gain growth 
momentum among them. Indeed, it is necessary to organize the free movement of knowledge between the partner 
countries. Dissemination of knowledge can not in any way imply a policy of not protecting intellectual property. Thus, it 
should be noted that without this type of protection such as patents, innovators would not be able to capture a market rent. 
Thus, it is important to disseminate knowledge by encouraging cooperation policies in R&D in order to encourage 
innovation. 
The most remarkable result of our study is to highlight the importance of the international diffusion of knowledge. The 
organization of cooperative agreements in R&D between countries is essential for growth in partner countries. At this 
stage, as well as other transmission channels of spillover technology have a positive impact on growth, cooperation in 
R&D is an important determinant of improved technologies and transferring them through a network of partners promotes 
the free flow of know-how. 
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Cooperation is a broadcast channel of externalities. The knowledge, contribute to knowledge creation. Yet this knowledge 
is externalities for though they are the result of a voluntary transfer, they are used by partners for their internal research. 
This shows the important role of technological spillovers as an important source of technical progress. In this context, 
several countries have so opted for a strategy of encouraging cooperation agreements in R&D through tax incentives and 
trade, the creation of investment promotion agencies etc.. 
    Indeed, to see how technology is acquired, it should be noted that it is not only physical but also integrated into the 
product components. For this acquisition of technology is a cumulative process in which learning plays an important role 
throughout the development and use of technology. For country's competitiveness Development through the improvement 
of its R&D science. However, technical progress and innovation are the result not only of R&D is only one link in a chain 
involving the wider learning by doing or "Learning by Doing," learning through the use of modern and also learning by 
interaction, or learning through cooperative R&D to innovation. Cooperative agreements in R&D are then a proxy for 
innovation activities in a sector or a country. This complementarity between different types of learning is a key factor in 
growth and is a strong indicator of developing nations. 
We now know that the interaction between FDI, technology transfer and productivity growth. The factors that determine 
the effect of FDI is the level of technology, human capital, institutions governing the innovation and learning, the degree of 
openness. Cooperation in R&D is not necessarily a substitute for other channels of transmission of know-how such as 
IDE, but it is an important supplement. We can then suggest the complementarities of cooperation in R&D and other 
channels of transmission of knowledge. These complementarities may be located on a purely microeconomic as it may 
seem at the interface between a micro-level FDI and a macro level: cooperation between nations to encourage R&D in 
poor countries where private R&D is low or almost absent 
Gain strategic in R&D cooperation is preferable to ex post, when property rights are not insured. The approach in terms of 
strategic externalities explains the proliferation of joint ventures in R&D. The combination of R&D to share the cost of 
innovation with another partner, it also aims to change the market structure, creating strategic externalities. Thus, a 
covenant is a means of accomplishing a strategic gain. 
Finally, we can say that cooperation in R&D is not just a game between two partner countries, but is part of a game with 
any two or more countries cooperate in order to exclude other partners in the race for R&D; innovation and therefore 
growth. 
In other words, cooperation is not just work with but also cooperates to deal with others. In this context, cooperation is a 
way to support organic growth and mergers - acquisitions. It allows anticipating competitors to catch up, to prevent them 
from entering the race for innovation, or even avoid any change in established positions. Technology agreements are 
associated with greater economic performance. Still, the use of cooperative R&D provides access to information and new 
skills that can improve the technological capabilities. 
The results of unit root test (IPS) indicate that all series contain a unit root. Thus, the traditional econometric procedures 
cannot be applied to the model. The cointegration test results show a relationship of cointegration between cooperation 
and economic growth. Results based on tests of causality show that a consistent statistical model cannot represent the 
effects of cooperative R&D on economic activity. Our results indicate a causal heterogeneity of cooperation in R&D to 
economic growth. The causality of economic growth to cooperation in R&D is also heterogeneous. Our results provide 
strong support to the view that economic growth causes the cooperative R&D. 
We examined the cointegration and causality possible cooperation in R&D and economic growth using data balanced 
panel of 32 countries covering 35 years 1970-2012. The results by country and IPS-based tests and causality tests in 
panel Developed by Hurlin and Venet confirm the existence of a positive and significant relationship between cooperative 
R&D and economic growth for most sample countries, although for some countries, the coefficients are low. This suggests 
that for some countries, the effort incentive to undertake R&D share is still dependent on their economic conditions and 
encouragement given to R&D. 
As part of our research, we dealt with in terms of the theoretical rationale of cooperation in R&D. In fact, we have shown 
that cooperation in R&D is useful in terms of economic surplus because it can lead to more profit through the increased 
level of effort in R&D. We discussed in our theoretical study year the patent system as an instrument of public policy to 
solve the dilemma of intellectual property rights. Indeed, to overcome the shortcomings of such a system, we have shown 
that cooperative agreements are a means to encourage investment in R&D while preserving the diffusion of innovations. 
These collaborations enable partners to exploit possible synergies. This tends not only to raise the level of investment in 
R&D but also their effectiveness reduced duplication of results, which in turn has a beneficial impact on total economic 
welfare. At this point, the benefits of cooperation in R&D to stimulate innovative processes are increasingly recognized by 
governments. So we said well the need to promote cooperative agreements in R&D. We have also seen that cooperation 
in R&D could be understood in different ways. Considering the organizational aspects of learning cooperation, the 
essential result is the demonstration that the objective through cooperation is better internalizes spillovers. 
Cooperative agreements in R&D can be designed as appropriate structures for sensibility / dissemination. Cooperation is 
a means to internalize the positive externalities cause a disincentive to invest in research. She then has the effect of 
increasing the amount of R&D while ensuring the dissemination of technological knowledge in the partners of the 
agreement. 
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We have shown the one hand, the fundamental role of technological cooperation and on the other hand, technological 
cooperation can be considered as a mode of governance to improve market efficiency R&D. Similarly, macro-economic 
co-operation avoids the under-investment in research and development. 
 At this stage, technological alliances and joint ventures are a means to encourage investment in R&D and innovation 
activities, without questioning the dissemination of research results. This alternative vision to the implementation of a 
system of protection does not preclude the Schumpeterian analysis. Indeed, it can correct market failures in R&D. Thus, 
by monitoring and internalizing the results of R&D cooperation in R&D, participants are able to capture the profits 
generated by their research, so that the tendency to under-investment is reduced. Note that the cooperation agreements 
allow for better dissemination of information that the system of ownership by providing it to all participants in the 
agreement. We have discussed some aspects as well play a role in the development of cooperative agreements for 
research and development. 
 In this perspective, we proposed the following hypothesis: Cooperation in R&D is a distribution channel of technology 
spillovers between countries aim to develop a dynamic model of cooperation in R&D. So cooperation on R&D is a 
transmission channel of technology spillovers. 
We have shown that the existence of externalities justified and led to advocate a different mode of organization in the form 
of cooperation. Indeed, technical cooperation is generally regarded as a means of improving the ability to generate new 
products and new production processes, generating their own competitiveness. The reasons are many. On the one hand, 
cooperation can partially remedy the many imperfections of markets, and secondly it increases the efficiency of research. 
Technological cooperation makes it possible to reduce the negative impact of these imperfections on investments in 
research and development, broadly defined. 
 In the same context, the theoretical models of cooperation in R&D focus on the use and protection of intellectual property. 
Voluntary or involuntary transfer of knowledge spillovers generate significant. The presence of such spillovers implies that 
a distinction must be made between the drive for innovation and the knowledge base effectively representing the total 
amount of knowledge available to society. This knowledge base stems from an effort to own R&D as well as the efforts of 
R&D of other companies. 
 Based on models of dynamic panel data model and the choice of premium we have shown that cooperation is a way to 
support organic growth and mergers - acquisitions. Indeed, it can anticipate the competitors to catch up, to prevent them 
from entering the race for innovation, or even avoid any change in established positions. Technology agreements are 
associated with greater economic performance. Still, the use of cooperative R&D provides access to information and new 
skills that can improve the technological capabilities. 
Table 3: Homogeneous Causality Test (FHNC , FHC) for CORD to  PIB 
Retards 
CORDPIB RDPIB KPIB LPIB 
F Hnc F Hc F Hnc F Hnc F Hc F Hc F Hnc F Hc 
1 3.21 * 3.79 * 1.91 * 1.52** 1.68 * 3.07 * 1.67** 1.78 * 
2 4.78 * 5.69 * 1.56 * 1.59** 1.52 * 3.25 * 1.53** 1.76 * 
3 3.69 * 5.49 * 2.56 * 1.81 * 2.04 * 2.57* 1.79 * 2.12 * 
Table 4: Homogeneous Causality Test (Fhnc, Fhc) for PIB to CORD 
Retards 
PIB  CORD PIB  RD PIB   K PIB  L 
F Hnc F Hc  F Hnc  F Hnc  F Hc  F Hc  F Hnc  F Hc  
1 3.10* 5.56* 2.23* 3.29* 2.01* 3.71* 3.10* 5.56* 
2 2.56* 5.1* 2.31* 2.66* 2.09* 2.78* 2.56* 5.1* 
3 2.71* 3.54* 3.16* 2.76* 1.65* 2.91* 2.23* 3.54* 
* Significaticant  level 5% 
** Significaticant level 10% 
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Table 5: Heterogeneous causality test (FHENC) for CORD to PIB 
Pays  
    
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Australie 18.91* 7.41* 4.82* 3.67* 2.52** 0.08 6.85* 0.57 0.81 0.47 0.11 0.84 
Belgique 13.97* 4.65* 2.61** 3.14* 2.86* 10.95* 2.66** 1.69 3.1* 4.13* 10.95*   2.66** 
Canada 0.42 0.68 0.77 0.43 1.98 0.015 0.09 0.15 0.16 0.41 0.11 0.01 
Danemark 1.02 0.45 0.49 0.45 0.95 2.28 1.99 1.66 1.68 1.168 3.15** 2.81** 
Finlande 0.28 0.35 0.3 0.45 0.96 0.03 1.18 3.67* 2.41** 2.16** 0.09 1.16 
France 1.16 0.78 0.61 0.54 0.17 2.27 1.02 0.78 0.86 1.42 5.11* 1.35 
Allemagne 1.16 0.33 0.96 4.21* 0.57 1.92 1.14 0.48 0.46 0.27 5.24* 5.8* 
Grèce 6.94* 7.71* 4.80* 4.21* 4.95* 6.77* 1.52 1.08 0.82 1.68 0.08 1.36 
L’Iceland 0.02 0.51 0.94 2.19* 2.02 2.27 0.74 0.56 1.21 1.58 2.4 0.91 
L’Ireland 3.85** 6.40* 2.62** 2.72* 2.31* 0.94 8.04* 7.6* 2.52** 3.31* 0.93 8.03* 
Italie 0.56 0.81 0.46 2.34 2.54** 1.87 2.18** 1.61 2.25 0.83 0.74 0.64 
Japon 1.68 3.11* 4.13* 1.38 0.7 0.51 0.3 0.21 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.38 
Corée 0.08 0.06 1.62 10.2* 2.58** 0.81 0.84 0.74 2.94* 1.12 1.49 0.91 
Mexique 2.08 2.78* 1.65 1.21 4.34* 2.78** 1.62 1.48 0.04 0.92 0.63 0.31 
Hollande 3.01* 1.97 2.01 0.59 0.09 0.09 0.38 0.38 0.25 0.33 0.18 0.14 
N-Zélande 1.31 1.15 1.51 0.26 0.05 0.53 0.32 0.21 0.07 0.08 0.28 0.32 
Norvège 2.21 2.18** 1.69 2.02 0.48 0.63 0.51 0.73 0.07 0.24 0.58 0.93 
Portugal 1.49 1.04 0.51 1.02 0.14 0.33 0.29 0.71 0.37 0.05 0.22 2.18** 
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Espagne 0.71 1.36 1.86 1.75 1.23 1.6 0.99 0.72 0.15 0.21 0.41 0.41 
Suède 7.67* 2.52** 3.29* 2.31 1.08 0.71 0.41 0.32 1.75 0.36 0.16 0.34 
Suisse 0.94 1.24 2.72* 0.82 0.71 4.91* 4.48* 2.92* 3.43* 1.64 0.98 0.64 
Turquie 0.91 0.83 0.79 0.71 0.23 0.13 0.31 0.32 0.56 0.07 0.29 0.54 
Bretagne 0.39 0.22 0.72 1.71 0.28 0.18 1.58 1.23 1.12 0 0.2 0.51 
USA 5.54* 2.89* 2.43** 0.69 4.92* 2.41** 1.12 2.56** 1.91 1.64 2.99* 1.69 
Tunisie 1.93 1.47 0.74 4.97* 2.71** 1.81 1.18 0.92 5.12* 2.31 1.68 0.94 
Inde 0.81 0.98 0.72 0.73 0.29 0.56 0.06 0.25 0.51 1.46 1.75 2.45** 
Israël 16.37* 7.14* 5.14* 0.35 1.71 0.48 0.44 0.49 0.81 0.51 0.35 0.33 
Chine 2.01 1.56 1.59 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.82 0.99 0.48 0.17 0.22 0.63 
Brésil 0.55 1.75 1.05 0.28 0.45 0.34 4.11* 1.17 3.26** 0.28 0.51 0.45 
Maroc 2.97** 0.11 2.26 0.23 2.92** 3.22** 0.97 3.24** 2.97** 1.39 1.11 1.11 
Algérie 8.76* 2.15 0.46 0.24 3.21** 2.04 1.73 2.36 0.99 1.05 0.93 0.62 
Egypte 1.27 4.99* 6.31* 0.61 4.31* 6.78* 1.48 0.003 19.43* 4.78* 3.72* 5.38* 
Table 6: Heterogeneous causality test (FHENC) for PIB to CORD 
       Retards 
  
Pays 
    
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Australie  0.28 1.52 0.13 0.356 0.38 7.53* 6.03* 7.27* 1.82 4.15* 7.45* 5.82* 
Belgique  0.01 1.67 1.02 1.48 2.13** 0.85 0.48 0.72 0.22 0.26 0.85 0.48 
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Canada  14.75* 7.31* 5.05* 3.25* 3.65* 0.29 1.08 4.40* 2.81* 2.39** 0.29 0.47 
Danemark  1.67 23.78* 13.63* 8.42* 11.62* 2.46 15.59* 11.78* 8.04* 4.97* 0.67 1.85 
Finlande  4.45* 5.04* 2.11 1.72 1.87 4.37* 2.42 1.31 1.27 0.78 4.97* 3.43** 
France  1.7 3.23** 3.91* 5.08* 2.35** 0.93 1.05 1.95 1.13 0.61 0.58 1.09 
Allemagne  7.60* 2.52** 1.84 1.03 0.46 4.36* 0.85 1.39 2.18** 1.8 1.88 2.63** 
Grèce  2.11 6.48* 5.86* 3.97* 5.45* 1.79 6.01* 6.44* 5.12* 4.71* 2.5 1.76 
Iceland  1.28 2.29 2.81** 1.53 0.82 3.81** 2.81** 1.38 0.89 0.64 3.57** 2.59** 
Ireland  0.002 15.58* 8.63* 11.2* 10.52* 23.47* 35.56* 20.25* 12.91* 10.96* 23.43* 35.39* 
Italie  7.15* 1.7 4.14* 1.54 0.85 0.59 1.05 1.39 2.31 1.07 0.74 0.46 
Japon 0.72 0.22 0.26 0.85 0.06 0.15 0.96 0.74 1.91 0.36 0.41 0.28 
Corèe  4.54* 3.03* 3.05* 1.73 0.44 0.88 1.04 0.67 0.27 0.29 0.59 0.43 
Mexique  2.39** 3.12* 2.01 0.42 2.85** 2.84** 6.71* 7.61* 0.4 0.27 0.71 0.87 
Hollande  1.81 1.44 1.03 2.34 0.55 1.24 0.99 0.63 1.09 2.1 1.57 3.11* 
N-Zélande 1.59 0.73 0.59 3.31** 4.78* 3.91* 0.17 0.07 0.01 0.15 0.21 0.21 
Norvège  3.21* 2.18** 2.25** 0.04 0.07 1.92 0.8 0.61 0.03 0.24 1.02 0.54 
Portugal  4.31* 7.06* 10.26* 2.96** 0.43 1.01 2.38** 1.61 0.002 0.04 0.34 0.64 
Espagne  1.35 0.91 0.04 0.39 2.73** 2.67** 1.87 1.29 0.134 0.34 2.41** 2.54** 
Suède  20.19* 12.96* 10.05* 3.91** 0.92 0.2 3.16* 1.96 0.17 0.23 0.18 0.26 
Suisse   1.91 0.004 0.99 0.28 0.56 0.27 1.01 0.21 2.17 0.32 1.39 1.38 
Turquie  0.97 0.35 0.18 0.16 0.414 1.27 0.93 0.51 3.67** 1.84 0.74 2.31** 
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Bretagne  0.64 0.52 0.24 0.12 0.23 0.94 0.86 1.54 0.51 0.26 0.22 0.23 
USA 0.66 1.84 2.99** 0.24 0.17 0.76 0.2 1.79 0.003 0.04 0.48 0.72 
Tunisie  0.77 0.67 0.24 1.85 1.58 1.09 0.16 1.34 5.42* 2.48 1.74 0.44 
Inde  0.16 0.01 0.28 1.1 1.14 3.84* 1.33 0.41 0.319 0.12 0.1 0.29 
Israël  0.35 0.38 0.19 1.38 0.14 0.11 0.88 0.38 0.74 0.16 0.26 1.24 
Chine  0.61 3.81** 2.18 0.81 0.91 1.81 3.58** 1.91 1.51 0.21 0.19 0.19 
Brésil 0.73 0.002 0.04 1.87 2.47** 2.46** 1.41 0.94 0.619 0.3 3.87* 1.67 
Maroc  1.69 0.43 0.71 0.77 0.52 0.32 0.24 0.66 0.44 0.38 0.48 1.044 
Algérie 1.56 0.05 0.51 0.42 1.97 0.85 0.1 0.55 0.62 0.86 0.67 0.46 
Egypte  1.91 4.35* 2.25 1.65 0.88 1.11 2.32 1.05 0.68 1.07 0.78 0.62 
 * Significatifcant  level 5% 
** Significaticant  level  10% 
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